O n April 10 of this year, nearly a month after a disastrous earthquake and tsunami struck Japan, thousands of protesters took to the streets of Tokyo, calling for an end to nuclear power. In the cityÕs Koenji neighborhood, a large group of mostly younger protesters, many in costume, chanted and banged drums. In Shiba Park, an older and more sober group demanded the closure of the Hamaoka nuclear power plant, located near a fault line about 200 kilometers (125 miles) southwest of Tokyo. 1 These public protests are symptomatic of a general decline in public support for nuclear power in Japan, a country that derived about 30 percent of its electricity from nuclear power in 2010. Recent polls have suggested that somewhere between 41 and 54 percent of Japanese support scrapping, or reducing the numbers of, nuclear power plants ( Kyodo News, 2011; Wallace, 2011; Yamada, 2011) . By comparison, a 2005 poll conducted by the International Atomic Energy Agency found that 82 percent of Japanese favored building more plants or maintaining existing ones (GlobeScan, 2005) . Partly in response to the recent growing opposition, on May 6, Japanese Prime Minister Naoto Kan instructed the operator of Hamaoka to shut down all three reactors there. Four days later, Kan called for a new energy policy with less reliance on nuclear power.
Japan is by no means alone. Around the world, nuclear energy has declined in popularity. In the United States, for example, a Washington Post-ABC poll conducted in April 2011 found that 64 percent of Americans opposed the construction of new reactors (Craighill and Cohen, 2011) . Another poll, conducted by CBS News in March 2011, soon after the Fukushima crisis began, found that only 43 percent of those polled would approve of building new reactors, down from a 57 percent approval rating in 2008 (Cooper and Sussman, 2011) . Support for nuclear power was similar or lower in countries as varied as Chile (12 percent), Thailand (16.6 percent), Australia (34 percent), and the United Kingdom (35 percent) (Fowler, 2011; Green, 2011; van der Zee, 2011) . Even in France, which relies on nuclear power for about three-quarters of its electricity, one poll found that a majority (57 percent) were in favor of abandoning nuclear energy (Buffery, 2011) .
These approval ratings are not strictly comparable because the polls were conducted by different agencies, asking different questions and providing different kinds of information prior to asking the questions.
2 Nevertheless, there is little doubt among those who study public opinion on nuclear power that, by and large, it does not command much support.
Nuclear power wasnÕt always so unpopular. For example, in the United States in 1977, when CBS News conducted its first poll on nuclear power, 69 percent of those surveyed expressed support for building more nuclear plants. Just two years later, after the Three Mile Island accident, public support had plummeted to 46 percent, and it dropped further to 34 percent after the 1986 Chernobyl accident. Since the 1980s, a majority of the US population has consistently opposed the construction of new nuclear reactors (Rosa and Dunlap, 1994; Bolsen and Cook, 2008) . Not coincidentally, there has been practically no nuclear construction in the United States since Three Mile Island.
The public perceives nuclear power as a very risky technology. In some cases, association with nuclear facilities is even subject to stigma. The nuclear industry has tried a variety of strategies to break down public resistance to nuclear power, but they havenÕt worked well. With growing public concern about global warming, the industry is experimenting with a new strategyÑplaying up the climate mitigation potential of nuclear power. While this has increased the benefit side of the equation for nuclear power, it hasnÕt decreased the risk perception associated with the technology, and nuclear power remains a reluctant choice at best. Renewable energy technologies offer the same benefits, making it unlikely that a large-scale Ònuclear renaissanceÓ will materialize.
A dreaded technology
What explains public opposition to nuclear power? Proponents of nuclear power often dismiss opposition as a Ònot in my backyardÓ (NIMBY) phenomenon. There is some evidence for this assertion: In polls, people typically express less opposition to nuclear power in general than to a nuclear plant that would be constructed in their own vicinity. But this is only part of the storyÑthe majority of those opposing a project are opposed regardless of whether the project is to be located in their vicinity or not. Therefore, the NIMBY phenomenon does not really explain opposition to nuclear power.
A more fundamental reason that the term NIMBY is inappropriate is that it overlooks the ethical objections that many people have to a variety of hazardous facilitiesÑincluding waste incinerators, oil refineries, and chemical plants, as well as nuclear power plants. Opposition to these facilities arises not only from a desire to avoid personal harm but also from the feeling that no community should be subjected to the risks that come with such facilities. Many researchers have suggested that the term NIMBY be avoided, if not entirely discarded (Burningham, 2000; Freudenburg and Pastor, 1992; Heiman, 1990; Kraft and Clary, 1991; Wolsink, 2006) .
The question, then, is why so many people see nuclear facilities as unacceptable, not just in their own backyard but in anyoneÕs backyard. The public is not homogeneous, and different individuals oppose nuclear power for different reasons.
3 But for the majority, opposition to nuclear power seems to be tied to perceptions of the risk of nuclear accidents, concerns about the disposal of nuclear waste, and low levels of trust in the nuclear establishment (Whitfield et al., 2009) .
Of particular importance is the publicÕs perception that nuclear power is a risky technology. To someone who evaluates risk using metrics such as the number of major accidents, or the number of deaths on a day-to-day basis, this might seem inexplicable. But studies of risk perception have revealed that most people have a much more comprehensive conception of risk that is based on characteristics such as the familiarity of the hazard; whether exposure to the hazard is undertaken voluntarily; features of the technology such as the magnitude of accidents it could potentially give rise to; inequities in risks and benefits; and the long-term implications of exposure to the hazard (Slovic et al., 1982) .
For decades now, psychometric studies based on detailed opinion surveys have examined how nuclear power fares in the public mind. Paul Slovic, a leading practitioner of this methodology and a pioneer in studying risk perception, has summarized the results of this research: Ònuclear power had the dubious distinction of scoring at or near the extreme negative end for most of the [above-mentioned] characteristics. Its risks were seen as involuntary, unknown to those exposed or to science, uncontrollable, unfamiliar, catastrophic, severe (fatal), and dreaded . . . . These results have since been replicated with many different populations in numerous countriesÓ (Slovic, 1994) . Given these problematic perceptions of nuclear power, opposition to nuclear facilities is not surprising.
Severe stigma
Studies also find that some aspects of the technology, especially those involving radiation, are Òsubject to severe stigmatization,Ó where the term stigma is used to denote Òsomething that is to be shunned or avoided not just because it is dangerous but because it overturns or destroys a positive conditionÓ (Gregory et al., 1995) . In stigmatized communities, what may be more dreadful to residents is not the direct experience of risk but rather the experience of how they are Ramana 45 viewed by others (Gregory and Satterfield, 2002) . A current example is how people from Fukushima are treated: Some people who have left the area since the disaster have been turned away from hotels, and their children have been called ÒbaikinÓ (vermin) and have been bullied (McNeill, 2011) . One young woman was reported as saying, ÒAs a single woman . . . IÕm worried about groundless rumors that women from Fukushima should not be chosen as wivesÓ (Ito, 2011) .
The stigmatization even extends to vegetables. Cucumbers from the Fukushima region had enjoyed a favorable Òbrand imageÓ for decades. Now, even vegetables grown in areas that are not subject to government bans are not saleable. Many farmers have reportedly not even bothered planting a cucumber crop this season (Ito, 2011) .
Such stigmatized perceptions of produce from areas near nuclear power plants are not confined to Fukushima or Chernobyl. People who live near the Kalpakkam nuclear facility in India reportedly never buy fish caught from the sea near the facility; local fishermen are forced to travel about 80 kilometers (50 miles) to sell their catch in the city of Chennai, taking advantage of urban anonymity (Chugoku Newspaper, 1992; Shivakumar, 2008) . Whether or not the fish are indeed contaminated, the perception that they are unsafe to eat has very real impacts on the livelihoods of local people.
Nuclear waste disposal facilities can also stigmatize a community. During the years when the United States was considering NevadaÕs Yucca Mountain as a disposal site for high-level radioactive waste, nationwide surveys showed that a majority of people felt that a repository would reduce the desirability of Nevada as a state to move to, and could deter them from visiting for a vacation or a convention (Flynn and Slovic, 1995) . Thus, regardless of whether there would be any harm to the health of the people of Nevada, they would suffer real economic damage from having a repository in their state.
Information or propaganda?
Faced with public antipathy, the nuclear industry has tried a variety of strategies to persuade the public to accept nuclear power. None of these have been very successful. One of the most common strategies is to publish numerous Òfact sheetsÓ that discuss issues of public concern. For example, Unistar Nuclear Energy, which seeks to build new nuclear reactors in the United States, has published Issue Briefs on its website with titles such as ÒNuclear Energy Facilities: Safe and Secure,Ó ÒIonizing Radiation and Public Health,Ó and even one claiming that ÒStrong Public Support of Nuclear Energy Continues its Positive TrendÓ (Unistar, 2011) .
A constant theme in such publications is that risk from nuclear power is low in quantitative terms. UnistarÕs Issue Brief on radiation, for example, has a highlighted box informing the reader: ÒCompared to your risk of dying from cancer caused by living near a nuclear generating facility, you are 630,000 times more likely to die from an auto accident . . . 50,000 times more likely to die from drowning . . . 450 times more likely to die from overexertion,Ó and so on (UniStar, 2011). The implicit assumption is that since most people do not shy away from buying an automobile or 46 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 67 (4) working hard on occasion, they should not be wary of UnistarÕs proposed nuclear reactors. Such comparisons, however, do not address the many qualities that people believe to be important to an evaluation of risk, such as familiarity and control. For example, most people are familiar with the risks of driving and can substantially control their own chances of dying in an auto accident. 4 Simplistic numerical risk comparisons, therefore, are not entirely appropriate and are more likely to produce anger than enlightenment (Slovic, 1996) . Indeed, many members of the public see the information provided by the nuclear industry as propaganda.
The implicit assumption behind many efforts to provide Òfactual informationÓ about nuclear power is that public opposition results from ignorance, often termed the knowledge-deficit model. Although this assumption is widely asserted, evidence for it is weak, and several studies have found no significant relationship between levels of knowledge about nuclear issues and support for nuclear power (OTA, 1984) . This is true not just of nuclear power. In a wide variety of arenas, it has been observed that local resistance is often greatest where education levels and access to information are highest, and many project opponents are well-armed with facts and figures (Heiman, 1990 ).
The importance of trust
A number of studies have found that knowledge is a less important factor than trust in determining peopleÕs attitudes toward nuclear power. For example, two psychologists at the California Polytechnic State University who studied how students at the university felt about the nearby Diablo Canyon nuclear power plant found no significant relationship between the studentsÕ nuclear power knowledge and their attitudes or behavior (Levi and Holder, 1988) . However, the psychologists found that Òthose who supported nuclear energy expressed more trust in the credibility of information received from government and industry officials and were more trusting that the officials would protect the publicÓ (Levi and Holder, 1988: 445) .
Distrust of the social institutions that manage nuclear energy is widespread. A 2001 survey by the European Commission, for example, found that only 10.1 percent of Europeans trusted the nuclear industry (EC, 2002) . In another survey, 68 percent of Americans disagreed with this statement: ÒThe US Department of Energy can be trusted to provide prompt and full disclosure of any accidents or serious problems with their nuclear-waste management programsÓ (Slovic et al., 1991) . Even when it comes to local government officials, 62 percent of Americans surveyed in one poll were unlikely to trust the opinion of a local government official (Johnson and Scicchitano, 2000) .
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There are many reasons for this absence of trust. In the case of nuclear waste disposal at the Yucca Mountain site, for example, the reasons included a site selection process that was perceived as unfair, attempts to coerce the state of Nevada, manipulation of regulatory criteria to make them fit the chosen site, and treating the public as if its concerns were irrational (Tuler and Kasperson, 2010) .
The major challenge for the nuclear industry today is regaining trust. Once lost, trust is extremely difficult to Ramana 47 regainÑa characteristic that has been termed the Òasymmetry principleÓ (Slovic, 1993) . This can be seen even in everyday life: Just because someone acts in a trustworthy manner today, there is no reason to believe that he or she will always do so. However, if a person has betrayed someone even once, there is clear proof that this person can (at least in some circumstances) be untrustworthy (Poortinga and Pidgeon, 2004) . It would likely take a long time for this person to re-establish her or his trustworthiness.
Unfortunately for the nuclear industry, distrust is periodically reinforced by evidence of safety violations by nuclear companies, or of ineffectiveness or corruption on the part of regulatory authorities. After the Fukushima crisis began, for example, newspapers reminded readers that the Tokyo Electric Power Company had continued to operate the Daiichi plant for two years after a safety inspector discovered in 2000 that a piece of equipment had become cracked (Onishi and Belson, 2011) . Worse, the regulatory authorities knew about the safety issue but did not force the company to shut down the plant and fix the problem.
In the United States, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission responded to the Fukushima accidents by assuring members of the public that US reactors were safe. ÒUS nuclear power plants are built to withstand environmental hazards, including earthquakes and tsunamis,Ó said a statement released by the Commission on March 12 (NRC, 2011) . But subsequent checks at all 104 nuclear reactors in the country revealed that, at a significant number of those reactors, there were problems that would have made some emergency equipment unusable in the event of an accident (Wald, 2011) . This discrepancy between reassuring statements and reality does not make for greater trust.
Lack of trust will also likely render unsuccessful the attempts by nuclear proponents to regain public support by offering newer reactor designs that are claimed to be safer. Examples are designs that incorporate passive safety, and Small Modular Reactors.
6 While these reactor designs are intended to inspire trust, they may have an unintended effect: creating distrust of older reactors that lack the touted safety features.
More fundamentally, the general public cannot be expected to evaluate detailed technical designs and convince themselves that these designs are accident-proof. To the contrary, the public can only decide that the newer designs are safe by trusting ÒexpertÓ opinions. In a number of cases, however, accidents and safety violations have occurred at reactors deemed safe by Òexperts.Ó Under such circumstances, there is little reason for the general public to trust statements about safety.
Climate change
The urgent need to reduce carbon dioxide emissions and prevent drastic climate change is possibly the most important argument for expanding nuclear power today. Proponents of nuclear power hope that it can be rebranded as a solution to climate change and thereby gain legitimacy (Stoett, 2003) . The empirical evidence from a number of public opinion surveys, however, is that concern about climate change has at best a modest impact on public support for building new nuclear power plants. A survey by Accenture 4. Wearing a seat belt, for example, reduces the chances of fatal accidents significantly. In contrast, those living in the vicinity of the Chernobyl reactor had no control over the accident that occurred in 1986. 5. In contrast, about 50 percent of the people were unlikely to trust a university scientist on nuclear power. 6. Passive safety features are those based on natural forces such as convection and gravity, rather than on active systems and components such as pumps and valves. 
